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Abstract
   Background: The risk preferences of individuals have an important role in many decisions under uncertainty. Buying 
insurance is a choice made under uncertain future outcomes. A community-based health insurance (CBHI) scheme has the primary 
objectives of reducing the health and financial risks related to unexpected catastrophic healthcare expenditures. It is assumed that 
the more risk-averse or loss-averse that individuals are, the more likely they are to favor the insurance.
   Objective: This paper examines the association of rural and self-employed households’ likelihood of purchasing the CBHI 
scheme with their own risk preferences (risk aversions for gains and probability prospects, and loss aversion), which are revealed 
by the field experiment in the rural villages of Savannakhet Province, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR).
   Method: To attain this objective, first a structured questionnaire-based household survey is employed to collect 580 rural and 
self-employed households’ objective data. Moreover, an incentive compatible lottery choice field experiment (Tanaka et al, 2010) 
is conducted to assess their risk preferences, which allows us to test the validity of the expected utility theory (EUT) and prospect 
theory (PT) assumptions simultaneously. Second, probit regressions are applied to examine the association between their CBHI 
participation and their risk preferences by controlling their demographic and economic backgrounds.
   Results: The findings of our study show that the probability of a household’s decision to enroll in the CBHI scheme is 
independent of the risk aversion towards gains but is significantly associated with the risk aversion towards probability prospects. 
A weak correlation between loss aversion and the choice to participate the scheme is found when CBHI ex-members are excluded 
and more demographic and economic related variables are controlled in the regression.
Key words: Prospect theory, risk aversion, probability prospects, loss aversion, community-based health insurance, rural Lao PDR.
1. Introduction
   In low income countries, the poor often suffer from high rates of illness due to the low standards of living (Orach, 2009). As 
a matter of fact, the poor are the most vulnerable group, especially for high exposure to risks and low access to sufficient healthcare 
services. It is recognized that ill health reduces work productivity leading to lost income. To reduce this vulnerability, the 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) scheme is considered one of the most powerful mechanisms to reduce both the health 
risks and financial risks caused by catastrophic healthcare expenditures for informally employed people, who are mainly lower-
income people.
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   Although the CBHI scheme has an obvious objective to reduce health and financial risks for the poor, the progress of its 
actual implementation is very slow, especially in low-income countries. According to an extensive body of empirical work, the four 
common problems of the CBHI scheme’s implementation are low enrollment rates (see, for instance, Basaza et al., 2008; Odeyemi, 
2014), adverse selection (Carrin, 2003; Wang et al., 2006; Parmar et al., 2012; Duku et al., 2016), poor quality of healthcare 
(Delavallade, 2017), and high drop-out rates (Dong et al., 2009; Mebratie et al., 2015; Panda, 2016).
   Especially, the low enrollment problem of the CBHI scheme is considered both a primary challenge facing the financial 
sustainability of the scheme and an indicator of low acceptance of the scheme (Wiesmann & Jütting, 2000). The literature often 
reports disappointing enrollment rates, with the percentage of the eligible population covered varying between 1% and 10% for 
most cases (De Allegri et al., 2006; Soors et al., 2010; Alkenbrack, 2013; Odeyemi, 2014) and rarely between 21% and 46% (Panda 
et al., 2014; Ozawa et al., 2016). Extensive empirical works highlighted some exogenous drivers and obstacles to the CBHI 
scheme’s uptake decisions (see, for example, Kyomugisha et al., 2009; Parmar et al, 2012; Dhillon et al., 2012; Odeyemi & Nixon, 
2013). However, the findings are varied for different case studies and scheme settings. Apart from exogenous factors, can 
individual-specific preferences describe their decisions to opt for the CBHI scheme?
   As suggested in the literature, risk preferences are of fundamental importance for individual heterogeneity (Dave et al., 2010) 
and are found to have a significant role in most important settings. The empirical correlation between risk preferences and 
economic behaviors under uncertainty is well-documented in a growing number of studies, such as on migration (Jaeger et al., 
2010; Bauernschuster et al., 2014), higher education enrollment (Breen et al., 2014; Heckman & Montalto, 2016), occupational 
decisions (Cramer et al., 2002; Ekelund et al., 2005; Bonin et al., 2007; Ahn, 2010; Batista & Umblijs, 2014), and technology 
adoption (Liu, 2013; Qiu et al., 2014). In the research on risky health-related behaviors, several studies have shown that risk 
preferences are likely to shape the likelihood that a subject engaged in cigarette smoking, drinking alcohol, becoming obese, seat 
belt non-use while driving, and failing to have insurance (Barsky et al., 1997; Anderson & Mellor, 2008; Pfeifer, 2012).
   Since the main purpose of health insurance is to reduce financial and health risks, the more risk-averse individuals are more 
likely to purchase insurance. There are some studies investigating the links between risk preferences and the likelihood of insurance 
uptake. For instance, Lammers and Warmerdam (2010) used standard lottery questions with hypothetical rewards to measure the 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of individuals, which is a measure under the expected utility theory (EUT). Furthermore, 
Pierre and Jusot (2017) applied a self-reported questionnaire with 11-point scales to measure self-perceived risks. Both studies 
found that the likelihood of health insurance uptake is significantly related with individual risk preference variations. However, 
both Lammers and Warmerdam (2010) and Pierre and Jusot (2017) elicited individual risk preferences with no monetary incentives. 
Glaeser et al. (2000) suggests that self-reported attitudes do not always indicate subjects’ real attitudes.
   To measure more realistic risk preferences, some studies conducted experiments with real money at stake. The study of 
Alkenbrack and Lindelow (2015) is particularly relevant to this paper as it examines the correlation between individual risk 
aversion and the CBHI enrollment in urban and semi-urban Lao PDR. Risk preferences are measured based on the EUT 
assumption. Household heads encounter five repeated gambles in which they choose a hand that they think having money. The 
stake is increasingly heterogeneous starting from “risk free” until the “all or nothing” risk. Another closely related preceding work 
to the present study is the work of Ito and Kono (2010), which assesses the reasons why the uptake of the Yeshasvini 
microinsurance scheme in India remains so low by focusing on the risk preference parameters of the prospect theory (PT). The 
experiment was designed so that there were equal probabilities of obtaining either a better or worse outcome (the risk aversion for 
probability prospects could not be observed). The risk parameters were defined as categorical dummies based on switching points 
that respondents made accordingly. Despite different theories of prior assumptions, no clear evidence results from the two studies 
on the relationship between risk preferences and health insurance adoption decisions. Overall, the existing evidence regarding 
whether individual risk preferences predict individual decisions to buy insurance is rather mixed.
   Therefore, this study aims to examine the association of households’ risk preferences on their decisions to participate in the 
CBHI scheme in rural villages of Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR with three main contributions to the literature. First, we conduct 
a field experiment to elicit the parameters of risk preferences with real money rewards. Second, we measure not only the 
parameters of risk aversion for gains and loss aversion but also risk aversion for subjective probability prospects (which is omitted 
in the literature). Third, unlike many preceding studies, experimental data allows us to test the validity of either the EUT or PT 
assumption1 simultaneously without a prior assumption.
   To attain the objective, we employ the risk elicitation experiment technique of Tanaka et al. (2010). The experiment is 
designed in a way that is more realistic with varied probabilities of winning better or worse outcomes. Despite an increasing 
application of this technique in a variety of contexts (Nguyen & Leung, 2010; Liu, 2013; Liu & Huang, 2013; Liebenehm & 
Waibel, 2014), there are still scarce applications in the health insurance setting, especially with respect to the voluntary CBHI 
scheme.
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   We select the CBHI scheme in Lao PDR as a case study because of its chronically low enrollment. According to Sydavong 
and Goto (2018), evidence shows that the CBHI scheme has positive impacts on rice production and cow holdings among enrolled 
households in rural villages of Lao PDR. Thus, to promote greater enrollment, it is necessary to analyze several dimensions of 
factors that lead to an increased likelihood of the scheme’s uptake, including both exogenous and behavior determinants.
   The remaining sections of this paper are structured as follows. Section two introduces the background of the CBHI scheme 
in Lao PDR. The next section details the experimental procedures, the estimation model, the data sampling, and the characteristics 
of the samples. The results are discussed in section four and the conclusion in section five.
2. Community-based health insurance scheme in Lao PDR
   In Lao PDR, health risk is expected to be an increasing threat to the poor, especially in remote areas (World Health 
Organization, 2012) where the majority of the population remains dependent on agricultural activities for subsistence and the 
infrastructure is inadequate. Therefore, the government is concerned with strengthening the health system – health financing 
schemes in particular – to ensure health equity for all groups in the population. 
   To improve the health system, the government launched four health financing schemes targeting specific groups in the 
population, including State Authority Social Security (SASS) for government workers, Social Security Organization (SSO) for 
salaried private and state-owned enterprises employees, Health Equity Funds (HEFs) for the extreme poor, and Community-Based 
Health Insurance (CBHI) for non-poor workers in the informal sector (Ahmed et al., 2013) presented in the 2010 World Health 
Report. There are more and more voices for the benefit of creating a single national risk pool. Now, a body of literature is emerging 
on institutional design and organizational practice for universal coverage, related to management of the three health-financing 
functions: collection, pooling and purchasing. While all countries can move towards universal coverage, lower-income countries 
face particular challenges, including scarce resources and limited capacity. Recently, the Lao PDR has been preparing options for 
moving to a single national health insurance scheme. The aim is to combine four different social health protection schemes into a 
national health insurance authority (NHIA. Among the four schemes, only the CBHI scheme is based on voluntary membership 
and decentralized implementation.
   As of 2014, only 27.2% of the population was covered by any scheme of the health financing system. Moreover, the 
decomposed coverage by scheme is rather heterogeneous. While the coverage of the SASS and HEFs schemes, which targeted 
nearly 26.5% of the Lao population, achieved approximately 85% of their target, that of the SSO and CBHI schemes made little 
progress, with only 6.4% of the targeted group enrolled. In particular, the CBHI scheme, which targets approximately two-thirds of 
the Lao population, achieved only 3.7% of the target by 2014 (National Health Bureau, 2014). In other words, the CBHI scheme 
has the largest target but the lowest achievement. Therefore, this study intentionally evaluates the CBHI scheme for three main 
reasons: 1. the scheme is voluntary, 2. the targeted population is mainly the poor in rural areas with limited infrastructure and 
geographic constraints, and 3. the scheme has made extremely slow progress towards the given target. 
   In 2002, the Ministry of Health (MOH) introduced the CBHI scheme as a pilot project in two districts with technical 
assistance from the World Health Organization and financial support from the United Nations Human Security Fund. As of 
September 2015, the scheme was available in 50 of the 148 districts in 17 of the 18 provinces, which is equivalent to 2,271 of the 
8,507 villages. The total number of beneficiaries was reported as 33,795 households (179,534 people). Currently, the benefit 
package of the CBHI scheme covers outpatient and inpatient services, including primary health care, specialist services, diagnostic 
tests, and prescribed pharmaceuticals that are available in hospitals. The household is the unit of enrollment, and the premiums 
vary depending on urban or rural residence and the number of household members. The premium rates have not been updated since 
2005 (World Bank, 2010). The window period of service access is three months upon enrollment. With the gatekeeping system, 
CBHI members have to first seek services at contracting facilities, such as dispensaries and district hospitals, and only referral 
patients are sent to provincial or regional hospitals (Annear et al., 2011)in Cambodia at Kampot operational health district and in 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic at Nambak district. Results: Six key variables were identified as determining the financial 
flows between the subsidy and the insurance schemes and with health providers: population coverage, premium rate, facility 
contact rate, capitation rate, cost of treatment and changes in administration costs. Negative cross-subsidization was revealed where 
capitation was used as the payment mechanism and where utilisation rates of the poor were significantly below the non-poor. The 
same level of access for the poor could have been achieved with a lower Health Equity Fund subsidy if used as a direct 
reimbursement of user charges by the Health Equity Fund to the provider rather than through the Community Based Health 
Insurance scheme. Conclusions: Purchasing premiums for the poor under these conditions is more costly than direct reimbursement 
to the provider for the same level of service delivery. Negative cross-subsidization is a serious risk that must be managed 
appropriately and the benefits of a larger risk pool (cross-subsidization of the poor. Since 2012, 50% of the scheme’s revenue has 
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come from premium collection, and the other 50% has come from government subsidization (Lao Government, 2012).
3. Methodology
3.1. Measurement of risk parameters
   Tanaka et al. (2010) incorporated prospect theory2 as an alternative theoretical framework to EUT in the experiment. PT 
presumes that individuals behave in a risk-averse manner for gains but are risk-seeking for losses. The real power of this 
methodology is evident in ways that, unlike EUT in which the risk preference depends solely on the gains, the risk preferences of 
PT are based on the gains, the losses and probability prospects. Therefore, researchers can simultaneously elicit three parameters 
concerning risk preferences: risk aversion, subjective probability weighting and loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman; 1992). More 
importantly, EUT, which is treated as a special case of PT, can be examined in the same experiment. That is, the methodology of 
Tanaka et al. (2010) enables researchers to statistically test the null hypothesis of the EUT. In PT, risk attitudes are jointly defined 
by two functions, including a value function of outcomes that explains the attitude towards outcomes (or the subject’s valuation of 
money) and a subjective probability weighting function describing the subject’s attitude towards probabilities. Decision making 
under risk can be viewed as a preference for either prospects or gambles. A utility function according to Tanaka et al. (2010) has 
the form as follows:
   where 
   U (x,p; y,q) denotes for the expected value of binary prospects. x and y are the outcomes with the corresponding probabilities 
p and q, respectively. v(x) is the power value function defined by the outcomes. If outcome is zero, v(0)=0. π(p) is the weighting 
function defined by the probabilities. If the probabilities are zero and one, π(0)=0 and, π(1)=1, respectively. σ captures the 
concavity of the value function, which is known as risk aversion3. λ illustrates the curvature of below zero compared to that of 
above zero, which is also stated as the degree of loss aversion (losses are weighed more heavily than gains). Notice that the higher 
the λ is, the more loss aversion that exists4. α is the parameter to identify the shape of the probability weighting function5. Note that 
for the special case where π(p)=p for all p – resulting from α=1 – and λ=1, the prospect value function would transform to the 
traditional EUT6. Due to the aforementioned advantages, the utility function of PT is employed in place of the EUT and probability 
weighting π(p) is employed in lieu of p. The loss aversion parameter λ is jointly constructed based on the utility curvature σ and 
switching point in series 3. Since series 3 of the experiment is designed given equal probability between option A and B, the 
probability weighting function is ignored.
3.2. Field experiment
   As Weber et al. (2002) suggested that the degree of risk taking of individuals is highly domain-specific, in the present study, 
it is crucial to assume invariant risk preferences of individuals over time and across decision contexts. Indeed, observing risk 
preferences of all household members is far beyond our limits due to experimental complexity and budgetary constraints. Thus, we 
again assume that the risk preferences of the respondents are an applicable proxy for the entire household’s preferences7. 
Additionally, we assume that the probability weighting in the scope of this study is interpreted as the probability of financial losses 
due to health care seeking8. This study is based on the risk elicitation experiment of Tanaka et al. (2010) that uses a set of two-
outcome prospects with monetary outcomes9. The lottery choice experiment is implemented to elicit the parameters of risk 
aversion, probability weighting and loss aversion of rural dwellers in Savannakhet Province. Our team paid significant efforts to 
collecting high-quality data. Accordingly, a paper-based method is used in place of a computer-based experiment for better 
comprehension of the subjects. 
   As is customary, to identify the household characteristics, each subject is asked a series of questions on socio-economic 
indicators prior to the experimental session, including their demographic details, household assets, microfinance history, CBHI 
experience, income and expenditure sources, and self-reported illness history in the 12 months preceding the survey. The 
investigators then distribute a sample sheet and explain the instructions to the subjects face to face as follows. 
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   • The subjects can either choose option A or option B in all cases. However, those who start off by choosing option A can 
switch over to option B at some point, but no double switches are allowed over each series10. In contrast, the subject who selects 
option B in the beginning cannot switch in reverse to option A, given that it is a logically coherent decision.
   • After all subjects complete the given 35 decision rows, each respondent draws one of 35 numbered balls from a box to 
determine a decision row at random and does the same from another box of 10 numbered balls to decide the real monetary reward. 
The mechanism is that each subject earns the actual money11 based jointly on the outcome of the lots and the choices that the 
respondent makes12.
Table 1. Risk experiment sheet
Option A Option B Expected payoff difference
Series 1
Probability 3/10 7/10 1/10 9/10
1 20,000 5,000 34,000 2,500 3,850
2 20,000 5,000 37,500 2,500 3,500
3 20,000 5,000 41,500 2,500 3,100
4 20,000 5,000 46,500 2,500 2,600
5 20,000 5,000 53,000 2,500 1,950
6 20,000 5,000 62,500 2,500 1,000
7 20,000 5,000 75,000 2,500 -250
8 20,000 5,000 92,500 2,500 -2,000
9 20,000 5,000 110,000 2,500 -3,750
10 20,000 5,000 150,000 2,500 -7,750
11 20,000 5,000 200,000 2,500 -12,750
12 20,000 5,000 300,000 2,500 -22,750
13 20,000 5,000 500,000 2,500 -42,750
14 20,000 5,000 850,000 2,500 -77,750
Series 2
9/10 1/10 7/10 3/10
1 20,000 15,000 27,000 2,500 -150
2 20,000 15,000 28,000 2,500 -850
3 20,000 15,000 29,000 2,500 -1,550
4 20,000 15,000 30,000 2,500 -2,250
5 20,000 15,000 31,000 2,500 -2,950
6 20,000 15,000 32,500 2,500 -4,000
7 20,000 15,000 34,000 2,500 -5,050
8 20,000 15,000 36,000 2,500 -6,450
9 20,000 15,000 38,500 2,500 -8,200
10 20,000 15,000 41,500 2,500 -10,300
11 20,000 15,000 45,000 2,500 -12,750
12 20,000 15,000 50,000 2,500 -16,250
13 20,000 15,000 55,000 2,500 -19,750
14 20,000 15,000 65,000 2,500 -26,750
Series 3
5/10 5/10 5/10 5/10
1 12,500 -2,000 15,000 -10,500 3,000
2 2,000 -2,000 15,000 -10,500 -2,250
3 500 -2,000 15,000 -10,500 -3,000
4 500 -2,000 15,000 -8,000 -4,250
5 500 -4,000 15,000 -8,000 -5,250
6 500 -4,000 15,000 -7,000 -5,750
7 500 -4,000 15,000 -5,500 -6,500
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   Table 1 displays the full set of pairwise lottery choices used in the experiment and the expected payoff difference in the 
rightmost column13. According to Tanaka et al. (2010), the experiment is categorized into 3 series of gains and losses. The choices 
are ranked in order of increasing payoffs. Each subject is confronted with a series of 35 paired choices, as shown in Table 1, but not 
the expected payoff difference. Subjects are asked to indicate a preference for either option A or option B in each decision row 
sequentially. Option A is relatively a safe choice, whereas option B has a higher expected payoff and variance. Note, however, that 
a higher prize can be earned at the cost of a lower probability for both options. The probability of gambles remains unchanged 
across series. Only the amount at stake in option B varies in each decision row of series 1 and 2 in which the probability of winning 
the higher prize in option A is relatively superior to that of option B. For instance, option A has a 3/10 chance to win 20,000 LAK 
and a 7/10 chance to win 5,000 LAK with certainty across series 1, whereas option B has relatively higher stakes but a higher 
variance of probability that ranged between 2,500 LAK and 850,000 LAK. Theoretically, only those who are very risk-seeking 
would choose option B from the beginning, or vice versa. Unlike the first two series, the value of both options systematically varies 
in series 3.
   The range of risk parameters is defined such that the subjects make the switching points following the models in Tanaka et 
al. (2010). The model is constructed by the manner in which the choices in series 1 and 2 of each subject are incorporated to 
measure the risk aversion parameters (σ and α), and only the parameter of curvature utility function (σ) is then combined with the 
subject’s choice in series 3 to determine the intervals of loss aversion (λ). Since Tanaka et al. (2010) provides the tables of the 
approximate values of σ and α, the experimental data in the present study refers to the point values in those tables14.
3.3. Estimation model of CBHI enrollment
   In this study, we estimate the likelihood of CBHI scheme adoption decisions by combining household demographic 
information and experimental data. In the empirical approximation, we initially run the probit regression with risk parameters and 
then consider the extension of including household’s demographics and characteristics to examine the sensitivity of the estimates. 
The distance to the district hospital is added in the regression as a general control for the village’s infrastructure. In practice, the 
following model is estimated as follows:
 (1)
   where CBHIi takes value of 1 if respondent i (representing the household) is a member of the CBHI scheme and 0 otherwise
15. 
RPi is the vector of risk parameters and SESi is the vector of socio-economic variables (household head gender, household head 
age, household head education, household size, agriculture area, and distance from village to district hospital). ε is the error term.
   Because only an interval of λ is measured by the experiment, following Liu (2013), the midpoint of the interval is used as the 
point estimate in the regression. For the elicited λ with a single bound – either lower or upper – resulting from selecting all option 
A or option B, we treat the observed bound as the point estimate. 
3.4. Data sampling
   This study collects the data of rural households in Savannakhet Province, which is located in the center of Lao PDR. The 
province has the largest land area and population size. According to the Center National Health Insurance (NHI) Bureau’s report, in 
2015, Savannakhet Province had the largest and most fluctuating number of CBHI members of all the provinces. For the sample 
selection in this study, districts and villages are chosen purposely, but representative households are randomly sampled according 
to the following reasons.
   • There are 15 districts in Savannakhet Province. Since 2014, eight of the districts have reported increasing numbers of 
CBHI-enrolled households, while the remaining districts have faced a decreasing number of CBHI members over time. Note that 
the provincial capital district needs to be removed from our selection because its infrastructure differs from that of the other 
districts. To ensure that the results will account for the views of heterogeneous respondents, we intentionally select two 
representative districts with increasing and decreasing numbers of CBHI members. Accordingly, we choose Champhone and 
Xaibouly Districts, which have the largest coverage of CBHI among increasing and decreasing districts16 for this study.
   • As our focus is households in remote areas, to ensure that the experiment can plausibly be conducted in these areas, we 
purposively designate only type II villages with a homogeneous infrastructure surveillance of “1 1 0 1 1 1 0”17. Finally, we identify 
three villages in Champhone District and six villages in Xaibouly District. However, one village in Xaibouly District is removed 
due to accessibility constraints.
   • All informal-sector households that are the targets of the CBHI scheme are eligible for this study. However, in practice, we 
purposely omit monks because interviews with them are implausible. The eligible population is stratified into three groups: CBHI 
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active members, non-members, and ex-members. Member respondents are randomly drawn from a list of currently active CBHI 
members in each village, whereas ex-members are randomly selected from a list of those who dropped out before August 2016. 
Non-members are randomly selected from a list of households in each village, which excludes households that work in formal 
sectors (employed households), member households and dropout households18. Finally, there are 580 stratified random samples19 
that represent 46% of the eligible population. Our samples comprise 210 (36%), 72 (13%), and 298 (51%) active members, ex-
members, and non-members, respectively.
   As is customary, we visit the chief of each village a few days beforehand to inform him of the objectives and tentative 
procedures of the experiment. Once the list of random respondents is recruited, a day prior to the experiment, the village chief 
announces the names of assigned household members to show up with the family book and CBHI member card (if his/her 
household enrolls CBHI scheme) at the given location (usually at temples). For the convenience, every 6 respondents are appointed 
one-hour intervals from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variables LECS V Full sample Subsample Mean difference test
Total
rural
SVK
rurala M EN N E M-EN M-N M-E
(3,616) (369) 580 (210) (370) (298) (72)
σ (risk aversion for gains) 0.88
[0.58]
0.9
[0.57]
0.86
[0.59]
0.89
[0.58]
0.75
[0.60]
0.04 0.01 0.15**
α (risk aversion for 
probability prospects)
0.71
[0.34]
0.74
[0.34]
0.69
[0.33]
0.69
[0.33]
0.7
[0.33]
0.05 0.05* 0.05
λ (loss aversion) b 2.28 2.21 2.33 2.31 2.43 n.a n.a n.a
Household head gender
 (1=male)
0.95
[0.22]
0.93
[0.25]
0.85
[0.36]
0.84
[0.37]
0.85
[0.36]
0.85
[0.36]
0.85
[0.36]
-0.013 -0.001 -0.009
Household head age 45.89
[12.52]
48.54
[11.68]
50.14
[13.42]
51.4
[12.44]
49.42
[13.92]
48.91
[13.84]
51.53
[14.12]
1.98* 2.92** -0.12
Household head  education 6.05
[3.50]
6.46
[3.68]
4.47
[3.87]
5.06
[3.63]
4.13
[3.97]
3.91
[3.91]
5.03
[4.12]
0.93*** 1.16*** 0.03
Household size 5.45
[2.22]
5.49
[2.06]
5.92
[2.16]
6.37
[2.29]
5.67
[2.03]
5.62
[2.07]
5.88
[1.87]
0.7*** 0.75*** 0.50**
Agriculture area (m2) 17,809
[22,029]
17,871
[20,651]
17.774
[22,802]
18,506
[24,438]
14,745
[13,867]
96.11 -635.8 3125.5
Distance to district hospital 
(km)
15.79
[5.40]
14.79
[4.11]
16.36
[5.95]
16.75
[6.03]
14.72
[5.33]
-1.97*** -1.57*** 0.06
Annual income (mil.LAK) c 26.7
[53.40]
26.47
[28.49]
15.3
[22.50]
16.6
[16.50]
14.5
[25.20]
14.9
[27.50]
12.91
[11.44]
2.06 1.68 3.67**
Standard errors are reported in brackets. M, N, E, and EN are CBHI currently active members, non-members, ex-members, and ex- and non-
members, respectively.
a SVK is Savannakhet Province where is our study area.
b Since only interval can be identified by experiment, S.E of the mean is not observed unless midpoints are used.
c Last 12 months reported (2015 price base).
3.5. Descriptive statistics
   The questionnaire-based interview and risk experiment are conducted for the sample of 580 households. Like the results of 
Tanaka et al. (2010), our samples make rather few switches from option A to option B across all three series, thus suggesting a 
considerable amount of heterogeneous distribution of risk preferences. Only 27.2%, 22.6%, and 35% of subjects make switching points 
in series 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A large portion of the respondents prefer option B from the first decision row in all series. Across this 
lottery choice experiment, the total reward is approximately 22,247AK earning per respondent, and ranges from -10,500 LAK to 
500,000 LAK20.
   The characteristics and measured risk parameters of the pool samples and subsamples conditioned to the CBHI status are 
summarized in Table 2. The mean difference tests are performed to examine whether systematic variations of behavioral predictors 
and other characteristic confounders exist across subgroups. We compare the characteristics of our samples with those of rural 
samples from the Lao expenditure and consumption survey, 2012-2013 (LECS V). Overall, our samples tend to be poorer, older, 
less educated and have larger household size. This outcome is unsurprising for the reason that only rural households of the informal 
sector are the eligible population of our study.
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   On average, the household heads of samples hold just four years of schooling/education. Additionally, the distribution of the 
last 12 months’ income is right-skewed. Interestingly, many of the mean tests indicate significantly systematic distributions of the 
observed variables across subsamples. For instance, the heads of enrolled households are likely to be older and more educated. The 
test still presents substantial differences with respect to household size and distance to the nearest hospital among subsamples.
   Compared to the risk preferences of Vietnamese villagers in Tanaka et al. (2010), the experimental data suggests that the 
majority of self-employed individuals in Lao PDR tends to be less risk-averse in gains and less loss-averse. However, the mean 
value of the risk-aversion in small-probability prospects in losses is close to that of the Vietnamese villagers. The mean test exhibits 
an undifferentiated risk aversion in gains among subgroups. It is evident that the degree of risk aversion towards probability aspects 
in losses is considerably heterogeneous, especially among members and non-members. Hence, it is of use to question whether the 
risk preferences and decisions that involve risk in our samples move in relation to each other.
4. Empirical results
   According to the measured risk parameters, the validity of the EUT hypothesis is tested. The null hypothesis of α = λ = 1, 
with the condition that the prospect value function would transform to the conventional EUT, is rejected at 1% confidence interval, 
thus showing strong evidence that the means of the observed α and λ are significantly different from one. The result suggests that a 
substantial number of samples behave in a coherent pattern with the PT.
   We next examine the linkages between households’ decisions to enroll in the CBHI scheme and their risk preferences. In 
addition to the full sample, we estimate separate models for the two subsamples. Subsample 1 is our interest in which the CBHI ex-
members are removed from the regression. However, for a comprehensive insight into any significant differences between CBHI 
members and ex-members, we intentionally include subsample 2 in the analysis. As a sensitivity confirmation, we report the results 
from four different specifications for all models. 
   The hypothesis that risk-averse subjects are more likely to engage in the CBHI scheme is confirmed with two main findings 
in this study. The regression results are summarized in Table 3. Among the three elicited risk parameters of PT (risk aversion for 
gains, risk aversion for probability prospects, and loss aversion), the risk aversion for probability prospects appears to be the 
strongest behavioral predictor. The estimates are positive and significant at 5% level in the full sample, but at 10% level in 
subsample 1. The results are robust, even upon considering the demographic and economic confounders. The findings imply that 
subjects who are less risk-seeking in moderate- or high-probabilities of losses are more likely to favor the CBHI scheme. 
Furthermore, weak evidence on the correlation between the loss aversion and the CBHI scheme uptake likelihood are found in 
subsample 1 when household head education, household size, agriculture land, and distance to the district hospital are controlled in 
the regression. More specifically, there is a growing probability to engage in the CBHI scheme since subjects are more loss-averse.
   Additionally, the association between many demographic variables and the likelihood of scheme enrollment is statistically 
significant and has expected signs throughout all specifications. Like the common findings in previous literature (Ito & Kono, 
2010; Alkenbrack & Lindelow, 2015), households with educated and older household heads and larger size are associated with an 
increased probability for the CBHI scheme uptake decision.
   Furthermore, what can be captured from subsample 2 is that the risk aversion for gains is positively correlated with the 
likelihood of scheme uptake decisions. In other words, the subjects who are relatively less risk-averse are likely to enroll, and those 
who are more risk-averse tend to drop out of the scheme. This finding might imply that because the ex-members are more risk-
averse, they therefore enrolled in the CBHI scheme in the first place in order to reduce the risks of unexpected catastrophic 
healthcare expenditures. However, once they enrolled, they might find that they rarely used the healthcare services or the benefits 
did not meet their expectations, then they decided to drop out of the scheme.
5. Conclusion
   It is well known that health insurance reduces the risks of unexpected catastrophic health expenditures. Thus, individuals 
with either high risk aversion or loss aversion are expected to favor the insurance. Although there have already been many studies 
examining the links between individual-specific risk preferences and their decisions to buy health insurance, evidence varies by 
country, health insurance setting, and the method used to measure risk preferences. Especially with respect to the risk preference 
measurement, some studies employ self-reported questionnaires or lottery choice experiments with hypothetical rewards (Lammers 
& Warmerdam, 2010; Pierre & Jusot, 2017), which do not always reflect the real attitudes of subjects. Conversely, some other 
studies conduct risk experiments with real money at stake, but the experimental design forces the researchers to establish prior 
assumptions on the theory of decision-making under uncertainty for the subjects, especially under either EUT (Alkenbrack & 
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Lindelow, 2015) or PT (Ito & Kono, 2010). Unlike the previous literature, this study employs the risk elicitation experiment 
technique of Tanaka et al. (2010), in which the validity of the EUT and PT assumptions can be tested simultaneously. We then 
relate the measured risk parameters to examine the association between individual risk preferences and the probability of opting for 
the CBHI scheme in rural villages of Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR.
   The findings suggest that a substantial number of samples illustrate risk preferences that support the hypothesis of PT. 
Subjects are likely to be risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses. For empirical analysis, the results suggest robust 
evidence that individuals who are less risk-seeking for moderate- or high-probabilities of losses tend to participate in the CBHI 
scheme. However, once the ex-members are excluded from the regression, we find additionally significant but weak evidence on 
the association between loss aversion and the scheme uptake decisions. Furthermore, we find that high risk aversion for gains is 
affiliated with the CBHI scheme dropout. Despite high risk aversion, why did ex-members drop out of the scheme? Further study 
on the stated preferences for their expected CBHI scheme merits future study, especially to determine whether the benefit package 
of the current CBHI scheme is a reason leading to the dropout.
   The significant correlation of the behavioral predictors with the likelihood of CBHI scheme enrollment shows that the 
decision to engage in the CBHI scheme for rural households in Lao PDR is not completely rational in exogenous predictors. 
Endnotes
1 See Sebora and Cornwell (1995).
2 In prospect theory, each probability pi for receiving the separate outcome xi is transformed to the probability weighting function p(pi).
3 If σ > 1, σ =1, or 0 < σ < 1, the subject is considered to be risk-seeking, risk-neutral, or risk-averse, respectively.
4 The theory expects the results of loss neutrality (λ=1) or loss aversion (λ>1), but not loss seeking (λ<1).
5 The function would be linear if α =1, but it would be S-shaped and inverted S-shaped if α >1 and 0< α <1, respectively. The inverted-S shape of 
probability weighting function favors risk-seeking and risk-averse preferences for small-probability and moderate- or high-probability prospects of 
losses, respectively (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). As stated in the study of Gonzalez and Wu (1999), probabilities below 30% are treated as small-
probabilities.
6 The risk attitude towards gains would be entirely explained by the value function in the case that the probability weighting function for gains is linear. 
By the same token, the risk attitude for gains is wholly defined by the probability weighting function for gains if the value function is linear for gains.
7 We exclusively identify either the household head or spouse as the representative of the household for the experiment. In the local context, the household 
head or spouse is the key decision maker over the allocation of economic resources within the household. Their risk preferences may be crucially 
relevant with the decision making of the entire household.
8 We thank Professor Shinji KANEKO for his insightful comment on this assumption.
9 The value of stakes is tailored to be consistent with the income level of rural people in Lao PDR.
10 Due to the assumption of subjects’ rationality, monotonic switching is enforced in this experiment.
11 The average payoff of the experiment is 22,000LAK, or about 70% of a single day’s wage of unskilled worker. 1 USD ≈ 8,200LAK in September 2016.
12 Once a subject completed all the given decisions, he/she also took part in another time discounting preference experiment, which is the subject of a 
separate article related to our CBHI scheme study in Lao PDR.
13 The expected payoff difference means the maximum amount of money that the subject is willing to give up in exchange for the allocation with certainty. 
Note that the subjects in the experiment were not given the payoff difference column. Prior to conducting the experiment, all subjects were asked 
whether they still wanted to be involved in the experiment in which they might face the possibility of a financial loss of their own money (but not a big 
amount). Fortunately, all participants were willing to take part in the experimental session.
14 See Nguyen et al. (2010) for the detailed sample of the risk parameter measurement.
15 Note that non-members and ex-members are not distinguished.
16 However, CBHI coverage in the Champhone and Xaibouly Districts accounted for only 0.21% and 0.1% of the provincial population in 2015, 
respectively.
17 The Lao Statistics Bureau classifies villages into three types. Village type I indicates an urban village with road access, electricity, water supply, a 
regular market, and administrative office; Village type II is a rural village with road access; and Village type III is a rural village without road access. For 
example, the “1 1 0 1 1 1 0” condition indicates road access (have), electricity (have), health care facility (no), clean water (have), village drug kits 
(have), primary school (have), and regular market (no).
18 The main survey was conducted on 13-27 September 2016 over the course of two days per village, on average. The participants were recruited and 
gathered with the assistance of the chiefs of the visited villages.
19 We exclusively identify the household head or spouse as a representative of the household in the experiment. In the local context, the household head or 
spouse is the key decision-maker over the allocation of economic resources within the household. Exploring their preferences might result in acceptable 
and successful health insurance intervention in the future. However, only 88.45% of respondents are household heads or spouses.
20 Apart from the risk experiment, we concurrently conducted a time experiment with real money rewards. Its results will be reported in a separate article, 
but the costs mentioned above are those of the risk experiment alone.
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